This paper studies a cheap talk model with two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information communicating with an uninformed receiver. The two senders' private information is complementary in the sense that the marginal impact of one sender's private information on the receiver's ideal action depends on the other sender's private information. When the two senders communicate simultaneously, their information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity: more information transmitted by one sender leads to more information transmitted by the other sender. When the two senders have like biases, it is always optimal for the receiver to delegate the decision rights to the sender with a smaller bias. When two senders have opposing biases, simultaneous communication is more likely to dominate delegation.
Introduction
Decision makers often seek advice from multiple experts who have expertise but whose interests may not be perfectly aligned with the decision maker's-an observation that motivated a growing literature on cheap talk with two senders (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989; Epstein, 1998; Krishna and Morgan, 2001a, KM hereafter) . A common feature of these models is that the state of the world is one dimensional, and both senders (experts) perfectly observe the realized state. For example, a CEO must choose the size of a new factory to produce a new product, the optimal size of which depends on the profitability of the new product. For that purpose, the CEO consults two experts who both observe the profitability of the new product.
While in some situations it is reasonable to assume that both experts perfectly observe the realized state, more typically each expert might only observe some aspects of but not the whole of * We would like to thank Yaron Azrieli, Maria Goltsman, Wojciech Olszewski, Marco Ottaviani, Gregory Pavlov, and the seminar participants at Ohio State, the Econometric Society Summer Meetings (2009, Boston), and the Midwest Economic Theory Meetings (Fall 2009, Penn State) for helpful comments and suggestions. the realized state. In a world emphasizing specialization, experts usually only have expertise in their own fields. In the factory size example, the two experts may be a marketing manager and a production manager respectively. Due to specialization, the marketing expert may only have knowledge about the demand for the new product, while the production expert may only have knowledge about the cost of production. Both pieces of information are essential to determine the profitability of the new product and the optimal size of the new factory.
Similar examples abound. For instance, consider a president who is deciding on a bailout plan for banks, the optimal size of which depends on how deep the banking crisis is and the constraints of the federal budget. The president consults one banking expert and one OMB budget expert, with the banking expert knowing only how serious the banking crisis is and the budget expert knowing only the availability of bailout funds. Alternatively, consider a military leader who in deciding how many troops to send to a war consults an intelligence expert and a field commander. The optimal number of troops depends on both the strength of the enemy and the strength of his own army. While the intelligence expert only knows the strength of the enemy, the field commander only knows the strength of his own forces. This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders (experts) have partial and non-overlapping private information regarding the state of the world. To model partial and non-overlapping private information, we assume that the state of the world has two dimensions, θ 1 and θ 2 . Each expert i perfectly observes the realized state in dimension i (θ i ), but does not observe the realized state in dimension j (θ j ). The receiver's ideal decision is a function of the realized states, y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ). We will focus on the case in which the marginal impact of information in dimension i on the ideal decision depends on the realized state in dimension j (i.e., ∂ 2 y * (θ 1 , θ 2 )/∂θ 1 ∂θ 2 6 = 0). In this case we say that two states are complementary. Our leading example, y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ 1 θ 2 , has an intuitive interpretation. 1 Consider the CEO example in which θ 1 is the demand size and θ 2 is the efficiency of production. In our leading example, the marginal impact of production efficiency on the optimal size of factory is larger when the market size is larger and vice versa. 2 As in other cheap talk models, each expert has his own interests, which we model as a bias relative to the receiver's ideal decision. Adopting terminology from KM, we say that two experts have opposing biases when one expert wants to pull the decision to the left and the other to the right. Alternatively, two experts can have like biases if both want to pull the decision in the 1 If ∂ 2 y * (θ1, θ2)/∂θ1∂θ2 = 0, say y * (θ1, θ2) = θ1 +θ2, then the cheap talk game with two-senders is qualitatively similar to standard cheap talk game with one sender. See Section 6 for a more detailed discussion. 2 In the military example, let θ 1 be the weakness of one's own army and θ 2 be the strength of the enemy. In our leading example, the weaker one's own army is, the bigger is the marginal impact of the strength of the enemy on the optimal number of troops. same direction, but possibly to different degrees.
We first study equilibrium information transmission when two experts send messages simultaneously. Equilibria are shown to be partition equilibrium in which each sender indicates only to which interval the realized state that he observes belongs, as in standard cheap talk models (Crawford and Sobel, 1982 , CS hereafter). We focus on the most informative equilibrium. Interestingly, the information transmission of the two senders exhibits strategic complementarity: the more information that one sender transmits, the less the incentive the other sender has to distort information in the direction of his bias, and, hence, the more information he will transmit. As a result, a reduction in one sender's bias leads not only to more information transmitted by himself, but also induces the other agent to transmit more information. Intuitively, when sender i transmits more information, the other sender j faces greater uncertainty regarding the principal's conditional expectation of the other dimension of the state space (θ i ). Given that the two states are complementary, this magnifies the expected loss if sender j distorts his information; thus sender j has less incentive to distort his information.
When the experts communicate simultaneously, the equilibrium information transmission depends only on the absolute value of the senders' biases. Changing the sign of either sender's bias does not affect the information transmitted in equilibrium, implying that whether the two experts have like biases or opposing biases does not matter. Moreover, it is always better for the principal to consult two senders instead of consulting only one. These results are in contrast to those in KM, where they establish that the equilibrium information transmission depends on whether two senders have like biases or opposing biases and that it is better for the principal to only consult one expert in the case of like biases. The differences stem from the fact that in their model the experts' private information perfectly overlaps, while in our model the experts' private information is non-overlapping.
We then study the possibility of delegation in which the receiver delegates his decision rights to one of the senders. The agent to whom the decision rights are delegated first consults the other sender regarding his private information and then makes a decision. We show that it is always better for the receiver to delegate decision rights to the expert with a smaller bias in absolute value. The underlying reason for this result is that the effectiveness of communication between the two senders does not depend on which expert has the decision rights. Therefore, the decision rights should be delegated to the expert with the smaller bias to minimize the loss of control experienced by the receiver.
Finally, we compare delegation to simultaneous communication. Interestingly, whether delegation is optimal for the receiver depends on whether the experts have like biases or opposing biases. When the experts have like biases and communication is informative under simultaneous communication, delegation dominates simultaneous communication for the receiver. This result still holds when two experts have opposing biases and the absolute value of the smaller bias is small enough. On the other hand, simultaneous communication dominates delegation if the two experts have opposing biases and the absolute value of the smaller bias is big enough. These results imply that we are more likely to observe delegation when the two experts bias toward the same direction relative to the principal. In a political context, delegation is more likely when either both experts are more liberal or both experts are more conservative than the principal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses related literature. Section 2 lays out the model. Simultaneous communication is studied in Section 3. In Section 4 we consider delegation and compare it to simultaneous communication. Section 5 discusses possible extensions and the robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes. All the longer proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Related Literature
Following the original work of CS on cheap talk, there is a growing literature on cheap talk with multiple senders. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) the model of KM with like biases by adding the twist that the receiver is able to commit to not best responding to the second sender. As observed in the introduction, a common feature of these models is that the state space is one dimensional and both senders perfectly observe the same realized state. In contrast, the two senders have partial and non-overlapping private information in our model. 3 Austen-Smith (1993) considers a two-sender model with two experts imperfectly informed about the state. In his model each expert receives a noisy (binary) signal about the state, which is also binary. This formulation yields results very different from those of standard cheap 3 For cheap talk models with one sender and multiple receivers, see Goltsman and Pavlov (2009). talk models. 4 In his model, the two experts' signals are correlated and the combination of both still does not fully reveal the realized state. In our model, the two experts' signals are independent, but collectively they fully reveal the realized state. Li (2007) studies a model in which two experts perfectly observe the realized state, but each expert's bias is his own private information. Again in his model the number of states and signals is finite.
Our paper is also related to Alonso et. al (2008) , who study strategic communication between a CEO and two division managers. Each manager has private information regarding the local conditions of his own division, and a decision needs to be made for each division. Furthermore, the decisions of the two divisions need to be coordinated, and each manager has a bias toward maximizing the profit of his own division. They compare two communication modes. In vertical communication (centralization), each manager communicates with the CEO simultaneously, and then the CEO makes decisions for each division. Under horizontal communication (decentralization), the two managers simultaneously communicate with each other and then each manager makes the decision for his own division. They show that even when the need of coordination is large, decentralization can be superior to centralization from the CEO's perspective. Our paper is different from theirs in that in our model there is only one decision to make instead of two.
Furthermore, the need to communicate in their model results from the need to coordinate two decisions, while the need to communicate arises in our model because the optimal decision for the receiver depends on the private information of both experts. These differences affect the experts' incentives to communicate. In McGee's model, the receiver's private information and the sender's private information are complementary, a formulation similar to our model. In all these models, however, there is only one sender.
Since the work of CS, it is well-known that cheap talk models have multiple equilibria. There have been efforts made on equilibrium refinement (Matthews et. al, 1991; Chen et. al, 2008 ).
We will follow a common practice in cheap talk models: whenever there are multiple equilibria, we will focus on the most informative equilibrium because it is Pareto dominant.
Model
To formalize the examples in the introduction, we provide a stylized model that can be applied to a broad range of institutional settings. Consider a decision maker (DM) who consults two experts i = 1, 2. The DM takes an action y ∈ R, and his utility depends on some underlying The utility functions are of quadratic loss form. Given realized states θ 1 and θ 2 , the ideal action for the DM is y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ). Specifically, the utility function for the DM is
For the most of the paper, we will use the specific functional form y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ 1 θ 2 . The robustness of our results with respect to different formulations will be discussed in Section 5.
Note that 
The biases are common knowledge. When b 1 and b 2 have the same sign, we say that the experts have like biases; otherwise, we say that they have opposing biases. Both experts and the DM are expected utility maximizers.
Simultaneous Communication
Under and m 2 . Since θ 1 and θ 2 are independent and expert i observes only θ i , the belief function can be decomposed into distinct belief functions g 1 (θ 1 |m 1 ) and g 2 (θ 2 |m 2 ).
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which requires:
(i) Given the DM's decision rule y(m 1 , m 2 ) and expert j's communication rule μ j (m j |θ j ),
(ii) The DM's decision rule y(m 1 , m 2 ) is optimal given beliefs g 1 (θ 1 |m 1 ) and g 2 (θ 2 |m 2 ).
(iii) The belief functions g i (θ i |m i ) are derived from the agents' communication rules μ i (m i |θ i ) whenever possible.
We first derive the DM's optimal decision rule y(m 1 , m 2 ). Given m 1 and m 2 , y(m 1 , m 2 )
Since θ 1 and θ 2 are independent, and θ 1 |m 1 and θ 2 |m 2 are independent, it can be readily seen that
As in CS and Alonso et.al (2008) , all PBE are interval equilibria. Specifically, the state space
is partitioned into intervals and expert i only reveals to which interval θ i belongs.
Lemma 1 All PBE in the communication game must be interval equilibria.
Having established that all PBE must be interval equilibria, we now characterize them. Let 
this indifference condition can be written as
which can be simplified as
In the appendix we show that
. The indifference condition (2) can be further simplified as
Similarly, the cutoff points a 2,n characterizing agent 2's partition equilibrium satisfy the indifference condition:
Inspecting indifference conditions (3) and (4), we see that there is strategic interaction between the senders' information transmissions in equilibrium as the term
appears in the condition that determines sender i's cutoff points. In the quadratic-uniform case of CS's onesender model, the indifference condition for cutoff points implies that the difference between the lengths of any two adjacent intervals, the incremental step size, is always 4b. Conditions (3) and (4) show that the strategic interaction between the two senders changes the incremental step sizes: the effective incremental step size is
A bigger E(m 2 j ) (conditional variance of θ j given m j ) means more information is transmitted by sender j. As one agent transmits more information, however, the effective incremental step size for the other agent decreases, which leads to more information being transmitted by the other agent. Therefore, the two agent's information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity.
Given a i,0 = 0, the solutions for difference equations (3) and (4) are:
In the most informative equilibrium, N i is the largest integer such that
Given N i and x j and using the fact a 1,N i = A i we can solve for a i,1 and derive the following expression for expert i's partitioning rule:
) is strictly increasing in N i , strictly decreasing in x j and b i , and strictly increasing in E(m 2 j ); (iii)
Lemma 2 formally shows that the two agents' equilibrium information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity: E(m 2 i ) is increasing in E(m 2 j ) and vice versa. This result comes from the fact that two states are complementary: the ideal decision for DM given realized states is θ 1 θ 2 . Intuitively, agent i's incentive to distort information in the direction of b i is mitigated by his interest in matching the action chosen by the DM to the actual state. When agent 2 transmits more information, m 2 (= E[θ 2 |m 2 ]), has a larger variance. For agent 1, distorting his information in the direction of b 1 by the same amount now leads to a bigger expected loss in terms of matching the action chosen by the DM to the actual state, since he now is less certain about the DM's beliefs regarding θ 2 . This reduces agent 1's incentive to distort his information (his effective bias), leading him to transmit more information as well. Note that when the two states are additive (
∂θ 1 ∂θ 2 = 0), this strategic interaction between two agents is absent. 6 For PBE of the overall communication game, a babbling equilibrium always exists with N 1 = N 2 = 1 and the DM ignoring the messages. Thus we do not need to worry about the 6 Suppose y * (θ1, θ2) = θ1 + θ2. Then the indifference condition for agent i's partition points ai,n is given by
It is clear that each agent's information transmission is independent from the other's, and the two-sender model collapses to a one sender model. existence of PBE. Straightforward calculation shows that the ex ante equilibrium payoffs for the DM, U P ST , and for agent i, U
ST (where the subscripts denote simultaneous talk), are given by:
By inspection, the most informative equilibrium on which we focus is also Pareto dominant.
Proposition 1
The most informative equilibrium is characterized by a pair of numbers of partition elements (N * 1 , N * 2 ). They satisfy
and are the largest N 1 and N 2 such that
Moreover,
Proof. By (7), E(m 2 1 ) and E(m 2 2 ) are maximized in the most informative equilibrium. By part (ii) of Lemma 2, E(m 2 i ) is increasing in N i . Moreover, E(m 2 i ) is decreasing in x j and x j is decreasing in E(m 2 j ). Thus E(m 2 i ) is increasing in N j as well. Therefore, N 1 and N 2 should be maximized in the most informative equilibrium. The total length of the partition for each agent 2|b i |x j N i (N i − 1) should be less than the length of the support of θ i , A i , which gives rise to condition (10) . The bounds of N * i come from part (iii) of Lemma 2. The bounds of E(
Corollary 1 In the most informative equilibrium, a decrease in b i results in not only an increase in E(m 2 i ) but also an increase in E(m 2 j ).
Proof. By Proposition 1, N * 1 and N * 2 are nonincreasing in b i . The rest follows Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 can potentially be empirically tested: when one agent is replaced by a new agent whose interests are more aligned with those of the DM, more information will be transmitted by the other agent. This is illustrated in the following example. In KM, equilibrium information transmission depends on whether the two agents have opposing or like biases. Specifically, if the two agents have like biases, then it is better for the DM to consult only one agent. When two agents have opposing biases, more information will generally be transmitted, and it is better for the DM to consult both agents. In our model, the following corollary shows that equilibrium information transmission does not depend on whether the two agents have opposing or like biases, and it is always better for the DM to consult two agents instead of one.
Corollary 2 (i) It is always better for the DM to consult two agents instead of one.
(ii) Fix all the other parameter values but change
) and E(m 2 2 ) remain the same, and each player's ex ante equilibrium payoff is unchanged.
Proof. Suppose the DM only consults one agent, say agent i. Then no information is transmitted by agent j. E(m 2 j ) reaches its lower bound
, and x j reaches its upper bound
. It follows that the effective incremental step size for agent i is (weakly) bigger than when two agents are consulted. By Lemma 2, this implies that both E(m 2 i ) and E(m 2 1 )E(m 2 2 ) are smaller when only agent i is consulted. This proves part (i).
Observing (8) and (9), we see that, fixing N i , E(m 2 i ) remains the same when b i is replaced by −b i . This means that E(m 2 j ) remains the same as well. Also note that condition (10) remains the same when the sign of b i changes. Therefore, N * 1 and N * 2 will not change either. This proves part (ii).
The differences in the results stem from the fact that in KM the two agents have the same private information and they communicate sequentially, while in our model the two agents have partial and non-overlapping private information. When two agents have the same private information, their messages can potentially discipline each other. In our model this strategic effect is absent because agents have non-overlapping private information. Given that the agents' information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity and that they have non-overlapping private information, it is always better for the DM to consult two agents instead of one. Example 2 Suppose A 1 = 7 and A 2 = 5 and that agent 1 has bias b 1 = 1.9 and agent 2 has bias b 2 = 1.9. Under NA assignment, the lower and upper bounds for both N * 1 and N * 2 are 1 (1.70347) and 2 (2.02791) respectively. The equilibrium N * 1 and N * 2 are both 2, the upper bound. Note that the upper bound seems hard to achieve (2.02791 is only slightly above 2): for N * 1 to be 2, E(m 2 2 ) has to be very close to its upper bound (when the message is fully revealing). The upper bound for N * 2 , however, is 2 as well. This means that even with just two partitions, E(m 2 2 ) is already very close to its upper bound. This is indeed the case. The lower and upper bound for E(m 2 2 ) are 6.25 and 8.33 respectively, while E(m 2 2 ) with two partitions is 7.6139.
The example above illustrates that even when an agent i's equilibrium partition has only two elements, the conditional variance of θ i given m i is close to its upper bound. This implies that the strategic complementarity in communication is already very strong and makes it very likely that in equilibrium agent j's communication will achieve the upper bound for the number of partition elements N * j . Given that these upper bounds on the number of partition elements are very likely to achieved, changing assignments will most likely just result in the number of partition elements switching (in which case part (iii) of Proposition 2 applies) as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3 Suppose A 1 = 40 and A 2 = 10 and that agent 1 has bias b 1 = 1/2 and agent 2 has bias b 2 = 1/8. Under NA assignment, the lower and upper bounds for N * 1 are 13 and 15 respectively, and those of N * 2 are 27 and 32 respectively. The equilibrium N * 1 and N * 2 are 15 and 32 respectively. Under PA assignment, the equilibrium N * 0 1 and N * 0 2 are 32 and 15 respectively.
We tried many numerical examples in which communication from both agents is informative but not fully revealing. In all of these examples, N * 1 and N * 2 always reach the upper bound. Therefore, we conclude that in most cases assignments do not matter for overall information transmission.
Delegation
Though the DM has formal authority to make the decision, he may find it optimal to delegate decision rights to one of the agents. Given that there are two agents, two delegation arrangements need to be considered: delegating decision rights to agent 1 (D1 delegation) or delegating decision rights to agent 2 (D2 delegation). Under either delegation arrangement, the agent to whom decision rights are delegated first consults the other agent and then makes the decision. In the CEO example, if the marketing expert (manager) is given the decision rights, he first consults the production expert (manager) regarding production efficiency and then combines this information with his own information on market demand to decide on the new plant size. We answer two questions in this section. First, which delegation arrangement is optimal (D1 or D2 delegation)?
Second, when does the DM have an incentive to delegate his decision rights?
Optimal delegation
First consider D1 delegation. In this case, agent 2 sends message m 2 to agent 1, and then agent 1 makes the decision y(θ 1 , m 2 ). Agent 1's optimal decision rule is y(θ 1 , m 2 ) = θ 1 m 2 + b 1 . Now the communication game between agent 2 and agent 1 is a one-sender cheap talk game with the receiver having private information, the setting studied by McGee (2008) . It can be shown that all PBE are partition equilibria (see McGee for details). Let N 2 be the number of partition elements and {a 2,0 , ..., a 2,n , ..., a 2,N 2 } be the cutoff points. In particular, given y(θ 1 , m 2 ), when θ 2 = a 2,n agent 2 should be indifferent between sending a message immediately to the left of a 2,n and a message immediately to the right of a 2,n . This indifference condition can be explicitly written as:
In the most informative equilibrium, the (largest) number of partition elements is N * 2 = h−
Note that under D1 delegation, the incremental step size of agent 2's equilibrium partition only depends on the difference in biases (|b 1 − b 2 |). As a result, N * 2 , E(m 2 2 ) and the equilibrium information transmission depend only on the difference between the biases of the two agents.
The principal's equilibrium payoff under D1 delegation, U P D1 , can be computed as
Now consider D2 delegation. In this case, agent 1 first sends message m 1 to agent 2, and then agent 2 makes the decision y(θ 2 , m 1 ). Agent 2's optimal decision rule is y(θ 2 , m 1 ) = θ 2 m 1 + b 2 .
Let N 1 be the number of partition elements and {a 1,0 , ..., a 1,n , ..., a 1,N 1 } be the cutoff points of agent 1's equilibrium communication rule. In particular, a 1,n is characterized by
In the most informative equilibrium,
Comparing the expressions for N * 1 and N * 2 , we see that the number of partition elements is the same under D1 and D2 delegation. The principal's equilibrium payoff U P D2 under D2 delegation is
Proposition 3 Between D1 and D2 delegation, it is always optimal for the DM to delegate decision rights to the agent with a smaller bias in absolute value.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose agent 1 has a smaller bias, |b 1 | < |b 2 |. We want to
show that D1 delegation is better for the DM. From previous derivations, it is clear that N * 1 under D2 delegation is the same as N * 2 under D1 delegation. Let N * = N * 1 = N * 2 . From (13) and (15) ,
By (12) and (14),
Therefore, D1 delegation yields a higher ex ante payoff. 
Comparison between delegation and simultaneous communication
Now without loss of generality, suppose agent 1 has a smaller bias, |b 1 | < |b 2 |. Between the two delegation arrangements, D1 delegation is optimal. We are interested in identifying the conditions under which the principal has an incentive to delegate instead of retaining decision rights and engaging in simultaneous cheap talk with both agents. Proposition 4 is related to Dessein (2002) , who shows that in a one-sender cheap talk model the principal prefers delegation whenever cheap talk is informative. In our two-sender setting, the comparison becomes more complex and richer. To understand Proposition 4, we list four effects of delegation relative to simultaneous communication and indicate whether these effects make delegation more or less attractive to the DM.
(i) Delegation leads to a loss of control, which is measured by b 2 1 . (-) (ii) Delegation always leads to more information being utilized in the dimension of θ 1 , since
The strategic complementarity of the agents' information transmission implies that more information will be transmitted by agent 2 under delegation. Delegation dominates simultaneous communication.
The condition that two agents have like biases is not necessary for delegation to dominate simultaneous communication. This is because even if two agents have opposing biases such that 7 Dessein (2002) compares the information gain from the second effect to the loss of control in the first effect.
effect (iv) works against delegation, effects (ii) and (iii) can still outweigh effect (iv), meaning that delegation leads to an informational gain. The following example illustrates this. Again delegation dominates simultaneous communication.
The proof of Proposition 4 indicates that as long as E(m 2 2D ) ≥ E(m 2 2 ) (that is, more information is transmitted by agent 2 under D1 delegation than under simultaneous communication) the principal prefers delegation. Thus we have the following corollary. 
Simultaneous communication dominates delegation.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 3 generate some interesting empirical implications. First, between two functionally parallel agents (e.g., division managers), it is possible that decision rights are delegated to one of the two agents. For example, in the example of a CEO choosing a plant size, it is possible that the CEO delegates decision rights to the production manager if he has a smaller bias than the marketing manager. Second, we are more likely to observe delegation when two agents's preferences are biased in the same direction relative to the principal. In the context of politics, delegation is more likely to be observed when both experts are either both more liberal than the DM or both more conservative than the DM. On the other hand, delegation is less likely to be observed if one expert is more liberal than the DM but the other expert is more conservative than the DM. In the context of firm organization, if both division managers are biased toward choosing a bigger factory size (e.g., empire building) relative to the CEO, then delegation is more likely-again because the agent with the decision rights is able to extract more information from communication with the other agent than the DM would be able to through simultaneous communication.
Discussions

Sequential Talk
Besides simultaneous talk and delegation, the DM can also let the two agents communicate with him sequentially. Specifically, one agent sends his message first, and this message becomes public. Knowing the first agent's message, the other agent then sends a message. A number of questions regarding sequential talk suggest themselves. First, which agent should talk first in sequential talk to maximize the DM's payoff? In other words, how does the optimal order of cheap talk depend on the parameter values. 8 Second, how does sequential talk compare to simultaneous talk and delegation in terms of the DM's payoff?
Suppose agent 1 sends his message first. Agent 1's communication rule is still μ 1 (m 1 |θ 1 ), but agent 2's communication rule now becomes μ 2 (m 2 |θ 2 , m 1 ), which, for simplicity, we denote as μ 2 (m 1 ). We work by backward induction. Given m 1 and m 2 , the DM's optimal decision rule is
]. Now given m 1 , consider agent 2's problem. It is straightforward to show that agent 2's equilibrium communication rule takes the form of a partitioning rule. In general, the cutoff a 2,n satisfies the indifference condition:
From the above equation, we can see that agent 2's communication depends on m 1 . In particular, a larger message sent by agent 1 (i.e., E(θ 1 |m 1 ) is larger) reduces the incremental step size of agent 2's partition, leading to more information being transmitted by agent 2.
Now consider agent 1's problem. We cannot guarantee that agent 1's equilibrium communication rule is of partition form. To see this, consider a modification of Lemma 1 in which
From (17), it can be readily seen that
where the second term follows (16) and (9) . Given that N 2 is increasing in v 1 , we are not sure that the second term in the above equation is greater than 0. Hence, the equilibrium communication rule of agent 1 might not be of partition form.
Now suppose agent 1's equilibrium communication rule is of partition form. To characterize the partition points, define m 2 (a 1,n , a 1,n+1 ) = E[θ 2 |m 2 , m 1 ∈ (a 1,n , a 1,n+1 )]. The indifference condition characterizing a 1,n can be simplified as:
From (16), we see that more information will be transmitted by agent 2 if m 1 increases. Thus
Inspecting (18), we see that this equation is highly nonlinear, so no general properties of the communication equilibrium can be derived.
Unless we resort to special numerical examples, we cannot draw conclusions as to the optimal order of communication nor make any meaningful comparisons between sequential talk and simultaneous talk and delegation. We leave these questions for future research.
Robustness
One may wonder how our results change if we allow for more general forms of the optimal decision function y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and for more general distribution functions of θ 1 and θ 2 . As is well known, analytical solutions and comparative statics in cheap talk models are very difficult to derive once we deviate from the uniform-quadratic loss benchmark case. For this reason, we confine our discussion to how the main results regarding simultaneous talk change in more general settings.
Instead of assuming y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ 1 θ 2 , suppose we only impose the conditions that y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is twice continuously differentiable, y * 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) > 0, y * 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) > 0 and y * 12 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) > 0. The principal's optimal decision given messages m 1 and m 2 becomes y
We first identify the conditions under which the PBE of the simultaneous communication game will be interval equilibria. As in the proof of Lemma 1, suppose that agent 2 employs a communication rule μ 2 (·) and that the agent 1's communication induces the DM to have a posterior belief υ 1 regarding θ 1 . Agent 1's expected utility becomes
From Lemma 1, the sufficient conditions for agents 1's equilibrium communication rule to be of the interval form are
By (19) , y * 1 > 0 ensures that the first condition is satisfied. The second condition can be written more explicitly as
Note that the conditions we have so far imposed on y * do not guarantee that (20) holds. To make sure that (20) holds, we need to impose the additional condition that |y * 11 |/y * 1 is "small enough." Similarly, to ensure that agent 2's equilibrium communication is of interval form, we need to impose the condition that |y * 22 |/y * 2 is "small enough." Now suppose that both |y * 11 |/y * 1 and |y * 22 |/y * 2 are small enough so that both agents' equilibrium communication rules are of interval form. With what functional forms of y * will the information transmitted by the two agents exhibit strategic complementarity? The indifference condition that characterizes agent 1's partition points a 1,n can be written as:
Inspecting (21), it is hard to tell analytically how the right hand side of (21) will change if m 2 becomes more informative.
To get cleaner results, we assume that y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = s(θ 1 )t(θ 2 ), where both s 0 and t 0 are strictly positive. The indifference condition (21) can be simplified as
Inspecting (22), it is still difficult to derive analytically comparative static results, the main reason being that we do not know how the ratios among V ar θ 2 (t(m 2 )), E θ 2 [t(m 2 )], and Cov θ 2 (t(θ 2 ), t(m 2 )) change as m 2 becomes more informative.
We further assume that both s(·) and t(·) are linear functions. Then
and Cov θ 2 (t(θ 2 ), t(m 2 )) = V ar θ 2 (t(m 2 )). Now (22) can be further simplified as
From (23), we can clearly see that the incremental step size of agent 1 decreases as m 2 becomes more informative. Thus the information transmitted by two agents exhibits strategic complementarity.
To summarize, we have shown that, if y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = s(θ 1 )t(θ 2 ) with s and t being linear functions and s 0 > 0 and t 0 > 0, then under simultaneous talk both agents' equilibrium communication rules are of interval form and their information transmission exhibits strategic complementarity. Of course, y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ) does not necessarily need to be restricted to the product of two linear functions for the equilibrium properties discussed above to hold. However, no more general conclusions can be drawn without specifying the functional form of y * (θ 1 , θ 2 ).
That said, the functional form restrictions we make above-which amount to assuming that
, where k 1 , k 2 and k 3 are some positive constants-are less restrictive than they may appear at first. After all, we always can redefine the underlying states (a i,n−1 ) . The indifference condition that characterizes a i,n now is written as:
After simplification, the above condition becomes:
Fixing a 1,n−1 and a 1,n , suppose that m 2 becomes more informative (i.e., agent 2's incremental step size decreases and he transmits more information). This means that E(m 2 2 ) increases, and the right hand side of (24) decreases. With a 1,n−1 and a 1,n fixed, m 1,n+1 must decrease, which implies that a 1,n+1 must decrease as well. The above argument shows that as agent 2 transmits more information, agent 1's incremental step size decreases as well, leading to more information transmission regarding θ 1 . Therefore, communication from the two agents also exhibits strategic complementarity under more general distributions. 10 
Conclusions
We examine a two-sender cheap talk model in which two experts have partial and non-overlapping information regarding the state of the world. In this setting, the marginal impact of one expert's private information on the receiver's ideal action depends on the other expert's private information. Under simultaneous communication, we show that information transmission displays strategic complementarities in that more informative communication from one expert induces more informative communication from the other. Interestingly, the informativeness of communication from both experts in equilibrium does not depend on whether they have like or opposing biases, but only depends on the magnitudes of these biases. When the decision-maker can assign the experts to the different dimensions of the state space, we show that under a broad range of circumstances this assignment will not affect the decision-maker's expected utility.
We then study delegation when the decision rights are delegated to one of the two experts.
We show that the decision-maker, if he ever delegates, always prefers to delegate decision rights 10 Under general distributions, the partition points depend on the shape of the density functions. Proof. First note that in any PBE of the communication game, the optimal decision given beliefs satisfies (1) . We first show that given any communication rule for agent 2, μ 2 (·), agent 1's optimal communication rule is of the interval form. Suppose the DM holds a posterior belief v 1 regarding θ 1 . Then agent 1's expected utility is
It can be readily seen that The same argument can be applied to agent 2 given any communication rule μ 1 (·) for agent 1. Therefore, all PBE of the communication game must be interval equilibria. The last inequality follows from a 1,1 > 0, which implies that A 1 > 2b 1 x 2 N 1 (N 1 − 1) . Thus E(m 2 1 ) is strictly increasing in N 1 . x 2 affects E(m 2 1 ) in two ways. First, a decrease in x 2 directly increases E(m 2 1 ). Second, by (5) a decrease in x 2 leads to a weakly larger N 1 , which increases E(m 2 1 ) as well. Therefore, E(m 2 1 ) is strictly decreasing in x 2 . By similar logic, E(m 2 1 ) is strictly decreasing in b 1 . Since x 2 is decreasing in E(m 2 2 ), it follows that E(m 2 1 ) is strictly increasing in E(m 2 2 ). To prove part (iii), note that E(m where the inequality is due to E(m 2 2D ) − E(m 2 2 ) ≥ 0. Now U P D1 − U P ST > 0 is equivalent to the term in the bracket being strictly greater than 0. More explicitly, E(θ Given that a 1,1 > 0, we have 
